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Since China re-established its CPA profession in 1980, CPA industry has 
experienced re-construct period, stable development period, disaffiliation period and 
expand period, in which government has made a series of regulations in cultivating 
auditing demand and promoting auditing quality. However, the independent auditing 
market is still dominated by buyers. Therefore, research on the incentives of auditor 
choice in Chinese transiting economy has important implications, which not only 
related to how to stimulate independent auditing demand and promote the benign 
development of auditing market, but also related to the perfection of corporate 
governance and the healthy development of capital market. 
With a sample of A-share listed corporations from 2001 to 2004, this dissertation 
develops a theoretical framework for studying on auditing demand in China, which is 
based on Chinese institutional background and existing literature, and intend to test 
the following questions empirically from perspectives of government behavior and 
property rights: (1) Whether there is quality differenciation among CPA firms in 
China? (2) What’s the role of governments in auditor choice? And how agency 
problems caused by ownership structure influence auditor choice? (3) Could market 
observe and identify the auditor choice behavior? 
This dissertation finds that:  
1. By investigating quality differentiation from information transparency 
perspective, the results indicate that, there is systematic difference of auditing quality 
among auditing firms. Accounting information transparency of big4’s clients is 
significantly higher than that of non-big4, while the evidence is weak for domestic 
CPA firms. 
2. By investigating on the incentives of choosing different auditors from view of 
ownership structure and government ownership, the results show that, both 
government regulation and ownership structure have influences on auditor choice, 
which can be showed in the following results: firstly, firms controlled by central 
government have incentives to choose high quality auditors, while firms controlled by 
local government have incentives to choose local small auditors, and private firms 
have incentives to choose national-level auditors; secondly, there is a non-linear 













the agency costs between management and shareholders are positively related to high 
quality auditing demand. These results indicate that, currently in China, there are both 
economic incentives and regulation incentives on auditor choice, government both 
play grabbing hand and helping hand roles on auditing demand.. 
3. By investigating the economic consequences auditor choice from perspective 
of equity capital cost, the results indicate that, among corporations with high 
information asymmetry, the cost of equity capital for corporations audited by high 
quality auditors is significantly lower than that of corporations audited by small 
auditors. These findings indicate that the function of auditing is recovering in our 
transit economy, corporations can lower their capital cost by choosing high quality 
auditors. 
    The innovations and contributions of this dissertation mainly lie in its method 
and conclusions. On methodology, this paper uses piece-wise linear regression, 
curvilinear regression and 2-stage OLS regression. On research questions and 
conclusion, this paper firstly establishes a brand-new theoretical framework for 
research on auditing demand in Chinese market; secondly, this paper investigates 
governments role in auditor choice; thirdly, this paper investigates the influences of 
ownership structure on corporation behaviors; lastly but not the least, this paper is the 
first one that use accounting information transparency to measure auditing quality, 
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